

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION

DARWIN ALLEN MOODY,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:05-CV-988-F
)	[WO]
)	
CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY,)	
)	
Defendant.)	

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Darwin Allen Moody [“Moody”], a county inmate, challenges actions taken by a state court in processing criminal charges against him for second degree theft of property and third degree burglary. Moody seeks dismissal of the aforementioned criminal charges.

Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that dismissal of this case prior to service of process is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).¹

I. DISCUSSION

A. The Named Defendant

Moody complains that the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama failed to conduct

¹A prisoner who is allowed to proceed *in forma pauperis* in this court will have his complaint screened in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

his initial appearance hearing within the period of time required by law. Specifically, Moody argues that the state court held the “48 to 72 hour hearing . . . almost three weeks later after my arrest date.” *Plaintiff’s Complaint* at 5. A state court is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *Moity v. Louisiana State Bar Association*, 414 F.Supp. 180, 182 (E.D. La. 1976), *aff’d*, 537 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1976). Dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint against the Circuit Court of Lee County is therefore appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

II. The Request for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

To the extent Moody seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for actions undertaken by the Circuit Court of Lee County in his pending criminal cases, this court lacks jurisdiction to render such judgment in an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as federal district courts “do not have jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” *District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); *Datz v. Kilgore*, 51 F.3d 252 (11th Cir. 1995); *Berman v. Florida Board of Bar Examiners*, 794 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1986). Moreover, a § 1983 action is inappropriate either to compel or to appeal a particular course of action by a state court. *Datz*, 51 F.3d at 254 (finding that a § 1983 suit arising from alleged erroneous decisions of a state court is merely a prohibited appeal of the state court judgment); *see also Rolleston*

v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1988).

In light of the foregoing, dismissal of Moody's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief arising from adverse rulings of the Circuit Court of Lee County is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). *See Clark v. State of Georgia Pardons and Paroles Board*, 915 F.2d 636 (11th Cir. 1990); *see also Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).²

C. The Pending Criminal Charges

Moody attacks the constitutionality of his confinement on criminal charges of second degree theft of property and third degree burglary pending against him before the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama. However, any challenge to these pending criminal charges provides no basis for relief at this time.

Under the decision of the United States Supreme Court in *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971), a federal court must refrain from interfering with pending state criminal proceedings "when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." The *Younger* abstention doctrine is premised upon a fundamental "public policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions." *Id.* at 43. In this case, Moody has an adequate remedy at law because he may pursue any of his federal constitutional issues through the state court system. *See generally Doby v. Strength*, 758 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1985). Specifically, he can assert a

²Although *Neitzke* interpreted the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the predecessor to § 1915(e)(2), the analysis contained therein remains applicable to the present statute.

violation of an untimely initial appearance in the on-going state criminal proceedings. Moreover, the plaintiff has not alleged the existence of any special circumstances which create a threat of irreparable harm. The mere fact that Moody must endure state criminal proceedings fails to demonstrate irreparable harm. *Younger*, 401 U.S. at 45. This court must therefore abstain from considering the merits of Moody's challenge to the constitutionality of the criminal charges pending against him as such claims are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action at this time. *Id.* at 43-44. Consequently, summary dismissal of these claims is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The claims against the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama and the requests for declaratory and injunctive relief be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
2. The challenge to the criminal charges pending against Moody before the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama be dismissed without prejudice in accordance with the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
3. This case be dismissed prior to service of process pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

It is further

ORDERED that on or before November 7, 2005 the parties may file objections to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. *Nettles v. Wainwright*, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See *Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc.*, 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also *Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, *en banc*), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 24th day of October, 2005.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

SUSAN RUSS WALKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE